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results show the eﬀectiveness of the proposed scheme.
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1. Introduction
Nowadays our life is becoming more and more permeated
with Internet or widely-used communication systems (GSM,
UMTS, CDMA2000, WLAN, etc.) and the technology allows
an easy access to an almost unlimited amount of infor-
mation. On one hand, the increased ease in sharing and
transmitting data is an important goal and a basic need in
our society; on the other hand the multimedia data need
to be protected against reproduction and nonauthorized
diﬀusion and modification. To satisfy these needs, several
techniques have been developed, among them watermarking
and cryptography.
Watermarking techniques are suitable for copyright
protection: before distributing the data, the owner embeds
an invisible signature, the watermark, into the host source
(audio, text, image, or video) using a secret key (see
Figure 1). In most applications, the existence of the signature
is kept secret and the secret key, previously shared on
a secure channel, is used to verify the presence of the
embedded sequence in the detection phase. The design
of a watermarking scheme is based on some important
requirements: imperceptibility of the hidden data, robustness
against data processing, capacity of hiding as many bits
as needed, and granularity. As widely demonstrated in
literature, such constraints are often in contrast to each other,
forcing the designer to find a tradeoﬀ among them. As far as
robustness is concerned, the watermark must be detectable
even after modifications, editing, or transmission of the cover
data. Therefore, several techniques insert the watermark into
the most significant portions of the digital data, so that it
cannot be removed without impairing the original content.
A diﬀerent approach for protecting data is given by
cryptography, whose aim is to make the to-be-protected data
not intelligible to any unauthorized user who might intercept
the message. The digital data have to be decrypted in
order to extract its information, being vulnerable to attacks,
and manipulations. Obviously, protection vanishes after
decryption. It is important to underline that the principle
defined by Kerckhoﬀs [1, 2] for cryptography also stands
for watermarking: the eﬀectiveness of a cryptographic system
should only depend on the secrecy of the key. The knowledge
of the ciphering, or of the watermarking algorithm, should
not allow an unauthorized user to decrypt the message or







Figure 1: General watermarking scheme.
to have information about the existence of hidden data.
Discovering a hidden message should only be possible with
the knowledge of the secret key. Besides this analogy, the two
techniques are complementary rather than overlapping and
can be combined to increase protection of the message.
In this work we consider joint encryption and water-
marking of color images, thus providing both levels of
security. As described in [3], it is possible to increase the
overall system security by utilizing a layered approach where
watermarking and cryptography are simultaneously used as
shown in Figure 2.
In the proposed scheme a key-dependent transform, the
Fibonacci-Haar Transform, is employed to add an additional
level of security. The main contribution of this paper is in the
joint use of a key dependent wavelet transform with a secure
cryptographic scheme. The intrinsic security of the method
is in the adopted cryptographic scheme.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2 the state of the art on color watermarking and
joint watermarking and encryption schemes is presented. In
Section 3 the proposed method is described in details, while
in Section 4 experimental results are reported. Finally, some
conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
2. Previous Work
2.1. Color ImageWatermarking. In literature several methods
have been proposed to protect digital color images by using
watermarking. However only few of them are considering
the relation existing among the color components. Most
of the proposed systems have been designed for gray
scale images and then independently applied on the color
components.
Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) has been proposed
as a tool for watermarking color images in [4, 5]. Xing and
Tan in [4] propose to partition each color component of the
cover image (the image to be protected) in nonoverlapping
blocks and to embed one bit of the watermark, using an
additive scheme, to the greatest singular value of each block.
The block size is adapted to the amount of information to
be hidden. The robustness of the whole scheme is increased
by scrambling the watermark before insertion through the
Arnold transformation. The basic idea is adapted to the
wavelet transform of the green component by Yin et al.
in [5]. In this case, the SVD of the chaotic scrambled
watermark is embedded with additive scheme, into the
SVD of the high frequencies subband components (LH,
HL, HH). This method shows an improved resistance to
some of the most common attacks as JPEG compression,
cropping, median filtering, resizing, and additive Gaussian
noise. Diﬀerent approach is presented in [6] where the
Discrete Fourier Transform-based watermarking scheme is
applied to diﬀerent color representations of the cover image
(RGB, YUV, and YCbCr) to highlight the advantages and
disadvantages of each color space. The color space YIQ,
adopted in the NTSC color TV system, is considered in
[7]: the watermark is embedded in the Discrete Wavelet
Transform (DWT) of both Y and Q components. The system
is robust against JPEG compression, filtering, cropping, and
additive noise.
Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) has also been used by
several authors as a suitable watermarking domain. Among
them, the scheme proposed by Ahmidi and Safabakhsh in [8]
is based on the permutation and adaptation of the watermark
before its embedding in the the middle DCT frequencies of
a block of the image. Li and Xue in [9] redundantly embed
the watermark into the DCT of the three color components
(RGB) of the image by applying a Direct Sequence Spread
Spectrum (DSSS) technique. This method grants robustness
in case of transmission in noisy paths.
More recent and advanced methods consider the cor-
relation among the color channels. Tsui et al. in [10]
present two watermarking schemes. The first one inserts
the watermark by performing the spatiochromatic Discrete
Fourier Transform (SCDFT) in the CIE-L∗a∗b∗ color space.
To satisfy the invisibility constraint the characteristics of
the Human Visual System (HVS) are exploited. The second
scheme they propose operates in the L∗a∗b∗ color space
by using the Quaternion Fourier transform. Both schemes
are resistant to diﬀerent attacks. As can be noticed, all the
methods are using some sort of scrambling to increase the
security of the system. In the following we review some works
that are going further in this direction, by adopting also
cryptographic techniques.
2.2. Watermarking and Encryption. Diﬀerent methods have
been proposed to protect digital data exploiting the advan-
tages of encryption and watermarking techniques. Non-
commutative schemes are usually proposed: either is the
cipher text used as secret information to be embedded or
a watermarked document is ciphered and deciphered by an
authorized user.
Puech and Rodrigues [11] encrypt the secret key with
an encryption method based on public-private keys. Then,
this secret key is embedded in the encrypted image by using
a DCT based watermarking method. The same authors in
[12] propose a lossless joint crypto-data hiding method for
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medical image in which the image is decomposed in bit
planes: the first semipixel image (the four Most Significant
Bit planes) is compressed with a similar Run Length
Encoding algorithm and stenographed with the patient
information; then, this image is ciphered with a secret-key
and scrambled with the remaining semipixel image (the four
Least Significant Bit (LSB) planes).
In [13] an hybrid image protection algorithm is pro-
posed. A prepositioned secret sharing scheme is used to
reconstruct encryption secret keys by communicating diﬀer-
ent activating shares. The activating share is used to carry
copyright or usage rights data that are embedded in the
content as a visual watermark. An SVD-based watermarking
scheme is used to insert the watermark. When the encryption
key needs to be changed, the data source generates a new
activating share and embeds the corresponding watermark
into the multimedia stream. Before transmission, the com-
posite stream is encrypted with the key constructed from
the new activating share. Once both the activating share and
the encrypted content are obtained, each receiver is able
to reconstruct the decryption key, decrypt the content, and
extract the watermark.
In [14] the image is divided into blocks of size 16 ×
16 pixels and the DCT of each block is computed. The
watermark is embedded into the encrypted LSBs of High-
DCT-data (the highest and the second highest frequency
coeﬃcients) of each block in order to replace one bit
every 8 with one bit of the watermark; the encryption is
performed with RSA [15] algorithm by using a private key.
Then the watermarked encrypted LSBs are decrypted using
the corresponding private key and then the watermarked
DCT coeﬃcients are obtained combining High-DCT-data
with original Low-DCT-data. On the contrary, in [16] the
authors propose to decompose an image in the Discrete
Wavelet Transform, to cipher the subbands in the lowest level
with Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), a NIST-standard
cryptographic block cipher [17], to cipher the subbands in
the high level with sign encryption, and to encrypt and to
watermark at the same time the subbands in the middle level.
Lian et al. in [18] recently designed a combined approach
also for video encryption and watermarking.
Recently the authors proposed a novel watermarking
and encryption method for color images, exploiting the
Fibonacci Haar Transform (FHT) as suitable domain for the
embedding [19]. Starting from those preliminary results, in
this contribution we go further, by performing extensive tests
on a database of color images. Moreover, the performances
are evaluated by computing the mutual information between
the original watermark and the extracted one. In this work
an optimization of the parameters used for the simulations
and the performances evaluation have been analyzed. Fur-
thermore, in this contribution a novel formulation for the
Fibonacci-Haar transform is introduced.
3. Proposed Method
Our goal is to create a joint embedding-encryption scheme to
allow watermark insertion and extraction without interfering
with the encryption scheme and vice versa. To increase the
security of the method, a key-dependent transform domain,
the Fibonacci-Haar transform, is used for both procedures.
We summarize the properties of the selected transform in
the next subsection. The crucial point is that no operation
like watermark embedding or detection as well as encryption
and decryption can be performed without the knowledge of
the secret key used to perform the subbands decomposition.
The embedding is based on SVD of the Fibonacci-Haar
subband decomposition because of the well-known SVD
properties: stability, scale invariance, rotational invariance,
translation, and transposition invariance, which are suitable
to counteract attacks like rotation, scaling, noise addition,
and others.
3.1. Fibonacci-Haar Transform Domain. The Fibonacci-Haar
transform is a generalization of the Haar transform [20] in
which the subband decomposition depends on the particular






0, n < 0;
1, n = 0;
Fp(n− 1) + Fp
(
n− p − 1), otherwise.
(1)
Diﬀerent values of p define diﬀerent p-sequences. For exam-
ple, if p = 0, we have the sequence of Fibonacci 0-numbers:
1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256, . . . , (2)
that is, the sequence of power of two. If p = 1, the Fibonacci
1-numbers are obtained:
1, 1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21, 34, 55, 89, 144, . . . , (3)
that is, the classical Fibonacci sequence. It can be demon-
strated [21] that, by using a Fibonacci p-sequence, with p ≥ 0,






where ci = {0, 1}, n is the number of bits needed to represent
N with the chosen p-sequence , and Fp(i) are the generalized
Fibonacci numbers.
These sequences have been used to define the Fibonacci-
Haar transformation matrices H(p,n), as in (5),




















































is a rectangular matrix obtained from H(p,n−p−1) by taking its
first F(p,n− p − 2) rows, that is,
H
(p,n−p−1)
i, j = H(p,n−p−1)i, j , i = 1, . . . ,F
(
p,n− p − 2),
(6)
for i = 1, . . . ,F(p,n − p − 2), j = 1, . . . ,N ; and H(p,n−p−2)
is a rectangular matrix obtained from H(p,n−p−2) by taking its




i, j = H(p,n−p−2)i, j , (7)
for i = 1, . . . ,F(p,n − p − 1) − F(p,n − p − 2), j =
1, . . . ,N ; and Ĥ(p,n−p−1) is a rectangular matrix obtained
from H(p,n−p−1) by taking the last F(p,n− p − 1)− F(p,n−
p − 2) rows:
Ĥ
(p,n−p−1)
i, j = H(p,n−p−1)i, j , (8)
for i = N−F(p,n − p − 1)−F(p,n − p − 2)+1, . . . ,N , j =
1, . . . ,N ; and H˜(p,n−p−2) is a rectangular matrix obtained
from H(p,n−p−2) by taking the last F(p,n− p − 2)− F(p,n−
p − 3) rows:
H˜
(p,n−p−2)
i, j = H(p,n−p−2)i, j , (9)
for i=N−F(p,n − p − 2)−F(p,n − p − 3)+1, . . . ,N , j =
1, . . . N ; and 0q×r is a (q × r) zero matrix.
Given a column vector x of size N , its Fibonacci-Haar
transform t is
t = H(p,n)x. (10)
The p-sequence used in the embedding process is the secret
key which is crucial for the security of the method. For
example, the number 256 is the 46th element of the 24-
sequence, the 66th element of the p = 45 sequence, and the
9th element of the 0-sequence (corresponding to the classical
Haar decomposition).
As illustrated in Figure 3, for the two images Lighthouse
and Parrot, the decompositions vary with p.
In general, if the cover image size is N ×N , where N is a
Fibonacci number, the subband sizes are
LL : Nn−1 ×Nn−1 pixels,
LH : Nn−1 ×Nn−p−1 pixels,
HL : Nn−p−1 ×Nn−1 pixels,
HH : Nn−p−1 ×Nn−p−1 pixels,
(11)
where Nn−1 is the number preceding N in the p-sequence and
Nn−p−1 is the number in p − 1 positions before N in that
sequence.
For instance, for an image of size 256 × 256 pixels
decomposed by using the 24-sequence, the sizes of the four
subbands are LL : 235 × 235, LH : 235 × 21, HL : 21 ×
235, and HH : 21×21, respectively, since the Fibonacci-Haar
24-sequence is
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19,
20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 31, 35, 40, 46, 53, 61, 70, 80,
91, 103, 116, 130, 145, 161, 178, 196, 215, 235, 256, . . .
(12)
3.2. Watermarking Insertion and Encryption. Let us consider
a color image X and let us denote by Xc, where c = R,G,B, its
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(a) p = 24 (b) p = 45 (c) p = 0
(d) p = 24 (e) p = 45 (f) p = 0
Figure 3: First-level decomposition of the Lighthouse and Parrot images: (a)-(d) p = 24, (b)-(e) p = 45, and (c)-(f) p = 0.
color components. In the following we will use the subscript
c to denote the generic color component. We propose to
perform both watermarking and encryption of each color
component in the Fibonacci-Haar transform domain. Let the
watermark W be a binary sequence of length Nw. To increase
the security of the watermarking system, W is spread in the
three color components, namely, WR, WG, and WB. In this
way even if an attacker succeeds in deciphering one color
component, he will not get enough information to extract
or to modify the whole watermark.
The embedding-encryption procedure, performed on
each Xc, can be summarized as follows (see Figure 4).
(1) The first-order decomposition of Fibonacci-Haar
transform of Xc is computed according to the chosen pc-
sequence (diﬀerent pc-values can be used for each compo-
nent). Let us indicate by Xc the correspondent transform.
(2) The LLc subband is encrypted by using the symmetric
block cipher AES with a 128-bit key.
(3) Each subband LHc, HLc, and HHc of Xc is parti-






· 2 + 1, (13)
z denotes the largest integer smaller than z, and Nn−1 and
Nn−pc−1 are the larger and the smaller dimensions of LHc and
HLc, respectively. For each color component Bc depends on
the chosen pc value.
(4) Each block is decomposed through the SVD. Accord-
ing to this representation every real matrix A can be
expressed as product of three matrices:
A = USVT , (14)
where U and V are orthogonal matrices and S is a diagonal
matrix whose singular values {s1, . . . , sNn−pc−1} are disposed
in decreasing order. Since the largest singular values have
a stronger impact on the perceived image quality, and the
smallest ones are extremely sensitive to noise, we have
selected the middle singular values {slc , . . . , smc} (lc > 1,mc <
Nn−pc−1) for watermark insertion. Notice that the maximum
capacity Nwc for each color component is given by
Nwc = Bc(mc − lc + 1). (15)
(5) For each block Ai(i = 1, . . . ,Bc) the embedding
is performed in the corresponding Si diagonal matrix,
























Figure 5: Color components of the Lighthouse image: original components (a),(d),(g), decrypted-watermarked components (b),(e),(h),
and encrypted-watermarked components (c),(f),(i).




Figure 6: Color components of the Parrot image: original components (a),(d),(g), decrypted-watermarked components (b),(e),(h), and
encrypted-watermarked components (c),(f),(i).
according to the SVD watermarking scheme proposed in
[22]:
s˜i j =si j−1−1.25Δ, if Wcj+(i−1)(mc−lc+1)=1, si j−1 − si j < 1.25Δ,
s˜i j = si j , if Wcj+(i−1)(mc−lc+1) = 1, si j−1 − si j > 1.25 Δ,
s˜i j =si j−1−0.25Δ, if Wcj+(i−1)(mc−lc+1)=0, si j−1 − si j > 0.75Δ,
s˜i j =si j if Wcj+(i−1)(mc−lc+1)=0, si j−1 − si j ≤ 0.75Δ,
(16)
where si j and s˜i j are the singular values of the original and
watermarked block, respectively, j = lc, . . . ,mc, and Δ is the
selected detection threshold.
(6) Find the smallest singular value a = s˜iz , with lc < z <
mc; in order to maintain the decreasing order of the singular
values, find the first b = sih < a, where h > mc. Replace the
singular values [siz+1 , sih−1 ] by linear interpolation between a
and b.
(7) The inverse SVD of each block is computed.
(8) The inverse Fibonacci-Haar is computed according to
the pc-sequence in order to obtain the c component of the
watermarked-encrypted image.
Figures 5 and 6 show the RGB components before
and after the encryption-watermarking process for the two
images Lighthouse and Parrot.
3.3. Watermarking Extraction and Decryption. The extrac-
tion of the watermark and the decryption procedures are
performed individually by analyzing the RGB components
of the watermarked-encrypted image X̂ . The following steps
are performed on each color component X̂c.
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(a) (b) (c)
Figure 7: Visual impact of the proposed encryption-watermarking scheme for the image Lighthouse: (a) original image; (b) encrypted-
watermarked image; (c) decrypted-watermarked image.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 8: Visual impact of the proposed encryption-watermarking scheme for the image Parrot: (a) original image; (b) encrypted-





Figure 9: Second Level FHT Decomposition.
(1) The first-order Fibonacci-Haar decomposition is
performed according to the secret key pc yielding to
X̂c, which allows the receiver to recover the Fibonacci
sequence used in the embedding-encryption proce-
dure.
(2) The L̂Lc subband undergoes an inverse AES per-
formed with the shared 128-bits secret key.
(3) Subbands L̂Hc, ĤLc, and ĤHc are partitioned into
the Bc blocks as described in Section 3.2 and each
block is decomposed through the SVD. The water-
mark Ŵc is extracted from the singular values of each
block as follows:
if ŝi j−1 − ŝi j > Δ, Ŵcj+(i−1)(mc−lc+1) = 1,
if ŝi j−1 − ŝi j ≤ Δ, Ŵcj+(i−1)(mc−lc+1) = 0,
(17)
where i = 1, . . . ,Bc, j = lc, . . . ,mc, and Δ is the
detection threshold.
(4) The three extracted watermark components Ŵc are
combined recovering Ŵ .
4. Experimental Results
In this section we show the results obtained in our exper-
imental tests. In particular, our aim is to show that the
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(c)
Figure 10: Equalization attack tested on a dictionary of 500 randomly generated watermarks: (a) red component after equalization attack;





















































0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
(c)
Figure 11: Equalization attack tested on a dictionary of 500 randomly generated watermarks: (a) green component after equalization attack;
(b) mutual information; (c) normalized Hamming distance.
proposed method is compliant with both the robustness and
the invisibility constraints.
The experimental tests have been performed on 25 color
images (256 × 256 pixels) that have been extracted from
the database freely available on the Internet (25 reference
images, 17 types of distortions for each reference image, 4
levels for each type of distortion) [23, 24]. The watermark is
a pseudorandom binary matrix generated by a secret seed.
4.1. Watermark Invisibility. In the design of a watermarking
scheme there is always the need to find the best tradeoﬀ
between capacity and perceived quality of the watermarked
data. In particular, considering color images, subjective
tests show that the human perception is less annoyed by
artifacts introduced in the blue component of the RGB color
space [25]. A possible motivation lies in the higher spatial
and temporal sensitivity of the red-green (Long-Middle
wavelength regions) opponent mechanism with respect to
the blue-yellow mechanism. Based on this consideration,
since the proposed method allows to select the amount of
data that can be embedded inside the color components
of the host image, we have inserted a larger part of the
watermark in the blue component.
The pc-sequences used in the reported results are pR = 45,
pG = 24, and pB = 0. This choice allows to decompose each
color component in blocks:
(i) the decomposition corresponding to pR = 45 allows
to obtain 23 blocks; in each block we set lR = 2, mR =
17, and Δ = 10;
(ii) the decomposition corresponding to pG = 24 allows
to obtain 23 blocks; in each block we set lG = 2, mG =
17, and Δ = 10;
(iii) the decomposition corresponding to pB = 0 allows to
obtain 3 blocks; in each block we set lB = 10, mB =
105, and Δ = 10.
To allow the reader to visually verify the perceptual qual-
ity of the decrypted-watermarked images, in Figures 7 and
8 we report the original, the encrypted-watermarked, and
the decrypted-watermarked images for two cases extracted
from the cited database (images Lighthouse and Parrot). The
encryption of the most perceptually significant subbands LLc
results in an image that is nonintelligible. The Fibonacci-
Haar decompositions obtained with the selected pc are
shown in Figure 3 for both images.
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(c)
Figure 12: Equalization attack tested on a dictionary of 500 randomly generated watermarks: (a) blue component after equalization attack;
(b) mutual information; (c) normalized Hamming distance.
Table 1: Quality evaluation of the watermarked components.
R component G component B component
PSNR (dB) WPSNR (dB) PSNR (dB) WPSNR (dB) PSNR (dB) WPSNR (dB)
Lighthouse 42 27 42 28 55 57
Parrot 45 30 44 31 55 49
In the performed experiments the first-order FHT
decomposition has been employed, since it is the best trade-
oﬀ between intelligibility of the ciphered data and perceptual
quality of the watermarked data. This is due to the fact
that when the FHT decomposition order increases, the size
of the LL subband (the amount of information encrypted)
decreases while the embedding capacity increases. In the
performed simulations we have exploited the maximum
embedding capacity, according to (15), for an image of size
256 × 256 pixels, by embedding a watermark of size 32 × 32
pixels.
To evaluate the watermark invisibility in the decrypted-
watermarked images, the Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio (PSNR)
and the Weighted Peak Signal-to-Noise Ratio (WPSNR) have
also been computed. The WPSNR is a modified version of
the PSNR suggested in [26]. This objective quality metric
is based on the computation of a Noise Visibility Function
(NVF) which depends on a texture masking function.
Following [26] we adopt a Gaussian model for estimating
the amount of textures in an area of the image. The values
of NVF are in the range zero (for extremely textured areas)
to one (for smooth areas). The WPSNR can be computed as
follows:






where L represents the maximum luminance value of the
images (255 for 8 bit of representation) that are compared,
and MSE is the Mean Square Error.
The perceptual impact of the watermark insertion in the
test images Lighthouse and Parrot, in absence of attacks, is
shown in Table 1. As can be noticed the PSNR and WPSNR
show good performances concerning the imperceptibility
requirement. Figures 7(c) and 8(c) show the decrypted-
watermarked image. In this work we have also tested the
possibility to recursively apply the FHT to the original image
to increase the embedding capacity. For example, the second
level decomposition results in a smaller LL subband and in
six middle-high-frequency subbands (as shown in Figure 9).
Experimental results show that the encryption eﬀective-
ness is preserved since it is not possible to visually understand
the image content; moreover a smaller LL subband corre-
sponds to an increased embedding capacity. The quality of
the deciphered-watermarked image is still good. The average
PSNR value for the three color components on the whole
database, when the maximum capacity is used (56 × 34 bits
for a 256× 256 pixel image), is around 45 dB.
4.2. Robustness. To evaluate the robustness of the embedding
method we used the Stirmark [27] system to attack the water-
marked images. Three kinds of attacks have been performed:
each addressing a single color component. This choice is
motivated by the fact that it is infeasible for an attacker
to recover all the keys needed for joint decryption and
watermark extraction from each component Xc. Simulations
show similar performances for the three color components
when the same attack is performed.
As an example of this common behavior in Figures 10,
11, and 12, the results obtained for the equalization attack
on the image Lighthouse are reported.
In the plots the Hamming distance dH(Ŵ ,W) between
the watermark Ŵ extracted from the attacked image and
the original watermark W , normalized with respect to the
watermark size, is compared to the the Hamming distance
dH(Ŵ ,V (i)) between Ŵ and the elements V (i), where i =
1, . . . , 500, of a watermark dictionary randomly generated. It
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(b)
Figure 14: Detector response to JPEG2000 compression attack: (a) mutual information; (b) normalized Hamming distance.
can been noticed that, for all the three attacks, dH(Ŵ ,W) is
rather smaller than dH(Ŵ ,V (i)), where i = 1, . . . , 500, thus
assuring very good watermark detection performance. For
completeness the mutual information I(Ŵ ,W) between Ŵ
and W , and the mutual information I(Ŵ ,V (i)) between Ŵ
and V (i) are plotted. For the mutual information between
two binary i.i.d sequences X and Y of the same length M,
the following formula has been applied:























P̂ = dH(X ,Y)
M
. (20)
We noticed that the highest peak corresponds to W while
for the other random watermarks the mutual information is
practically null.
As mentioned before, the behavior for the three color
components is similar; therefore, in the following, we discuss
the results obtained for the green component averaged over
the whole database. Several attacks have been considered; for
each manipulation, Table 2 reports the mutual information
between the embedded watermark and the watermark
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(b)
Figure 15: Detector response to rotation attack: (a) mutual information; (b) normalized Hamming distance.
Table 2: Mutual information values between the original watermark and the extracted one after attacks.
Attack Parameters Embedded
Gaussian mean = 0, and standard deviation =1 0.29
Sharpening 3-by-3 contrast enhancement filter 0.28
Motion linear motion of a camera by 10 pixels 0.27
Blurring using a circular averaging filter within the square matrix of size = 5 0.26
Median using a median filter within the square matrix of size = 3 0.28
extracted after the attack. For JPEG and JPEG2000 compres-
sion attacks the sensitivity of the mutual information to the
compression ratio and quality factor has been assessed.
Results are, respectively, shown in Figures 13 and 14.
In particular, quality factors from 10 to 100 with step 10
for JPEG, and compression ratios varying from 0.1 to 1
with step 0.1 for JPEG2000, have been employed. Mutual
information between the detected watermark after decoding
and 500 random watermarks is practically null and therefore
has not been displayed. Even in this case, the presented
values are the average values computed for the whole set of
images contained in the database. Rotation attack has also
been performed with rotation angle increasing from 0 to
40 degrees. In Figure 15 the average values of the mutual
information are depicted. Once again mutual information
between the restored watermark and 500 randomly selected
watermarks is practically null.
Results show that it is always possible to extract the
inserted watermark, thus verifying the robustness of the
proposed method. As already stated, the proposed method
is used to increase the security of the whole system, by
further protecting the information with the data hiding
technique, after the image decryption. The main security
constraint is in the knowledge of the encryption keys used
for the AES procedure. From a cryptoanalysis point of
view, the strength of the whole procedure strictly depends
on the security of the AES algorithm [28]. As mentioned
before, once the encrypted and watermarked image has
been decrypted, the content is still protected thanks to the
watermark presence. To this aim the importance of the secret
key pc is crucial. To demonstrate this, we have extracted the
watermark by choosing a diﬀerent p˜c from the one used in
the embedding-encryption procedure, and we have evaluated
the performances in terms of mutual information between
the original and the extracted watermark. For example, by
using p˜R = 24, p˜G = 0, and p˜B = 45 the mutual information
value decreases from 0.92 (computed by using the correct pc,
that is pR = 45, pG = 24 and pB = 0) to 0.03.
5. Conclusion
In this work we proposed a new joint watermarking and
encryption technique for color images, which exploits the
Fibonacci-Haar wavelet transform domain to increase its
security. The three RGB color components are ciphered with
the standard block cipher AES and watermarked via an SVD-
based blind watermarking method. The intrinsic security
of the method is in the AES scheme. Several experimental
tests have been performed to verify the impact on the
perceived quality of the watermark insertion and to verify
the robustness of the adopted watermarking procedure.
EURASIP Journal on Advances in Signal Processing 13
The performances have been evaluated in terms of mutual
information and normalized Hamming distance.
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